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Abstract: The diagnosis of possible faults in railway signaling systems is an important issue to provide 
safe travel and transportation in railways. Signaling system designers have to consider the possible faults 
which may occur in railway field components both on the requirements preparation phase and on the 
development phase of the signaling system software or namely, the interlocking system. Although the 
diagnosis of different unobservable faults is relatively hard, especially for large scale railway fields, this 
complexity can be overcome by using the Discrete Event System (DES) based modular diagnosis 
approach which is explained in this paper. The main advantage of using such modular approach for fault 
diagnosis in fixed-block signaling systems is the inspection of the diagnosability of the whole system 
with respect to its subsystems (railway field components). In this study, the diagnosability of the railway 
field equipment and the whole system is also explained with a case study. 
Keywords: Discrete Event Systems, Modular Fault Diagnosis, Fixed-Block Railway Signaling Systems. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The use of railway transportation among different alternatives 
(e.g. road and air transportation) brings many profits such as 
less carbon dioxide emission and energy consumption. 
Although the infrastructure and the signaling costs of 
railways are high, they provide more environmental friendly 
and affordable solutions. 
Railway signaling systems are divided into two main 
categories named as fixed-block (conventional) and moving-
block signaling systems. Train movements are rely on route 
reservation procedure in fixed-block signaling systems. The 
requirements of each route including the railway field 
equipment are pre-defined in the interlocking table. Railway 
lines are divided into fixed-length rail blocks. Each railway 
block consists of an entrance signal and an exit signal. These 
signals inform the train driver about the situation of the next 
railway block. Although the use of the fixed-block signaling 
systems decreases the efficient use of the existing railway 
lines, it has been in use since mid-1800s in all over the world. 
As with all other safety-critical applications, standards are 
defined to combine different safety requirements and 
concepts for railways. Software development process for 
fixed-block signaling systems including the choice of 
hardware and the communication protocols are defined by the 
EN 50126, EN 50128 and EN 50129 standards. In addition to 
the requirements and recommendations of railway related 
functional safety standards, signaling system engineers 
should take fault diagnosis into account while developing the 
signaling system software, or in other words, the interlocking 
system. (IEC 61508-7) describes fault diagnosis as the 
process of determining if a system is in a faulty state or not 
and it should be performed at the smallest subsystem level 
because smaller subsystems allow a more detailed diagnosis 
of faults. 
Detecting faults in railway signaling systems, especially the 
faults which may occur in field components (e.g. points, 
signals) is a vital issue due to its harsh results. Therefore, 
fault diagnosis and condition monitoring studies on railway 
point mechanisms can be found in the literature (Rouvray et 
al. 1998; Roberts et al. 2002; Garcia Marquez et al. 2003; 
Zattoni 2006). However, these studies are addressed the fault 
diagnosis problem from a different perspective. 
Due to having DES-like features in their structure 
(Cassandras and Lafortune 2008), and the recommendation of 
railway related safety standards such as (IEC 61508-3) and 
(EN 50128), fixed-block signaling systems can be regarded 
as discrete event systems (DESs) and the DES based 
modeling and fault diagnosis methods are applicable to fixed-
block signaling systems.  
However, diagnosability is described by (Sampath et al. 
1995) as the detection with a finite delay occurrence of 
failures of any type using the record of observable events. 
The diagnoser is obtained by using the system model itself 
and it observes online the behavior of the system (Sampath et 
al. 1996). The studies of (Sampath et al. 1995) and (Sampath 
et al. 1996) defined the basics of DES based fault diagnosis 
and these basics further developed by many workgroups and 
  
     
 
studied as online (Ramirez-Trevino et al. 2007), centralized 
(Ushio et al. 1998; Chung 2005), decentralized (Debouk et al. 
2000; Cabasino et al. 2013) and so on. As an application of 
DES based fault diagnosis to fixed-block railway signaling 
systems, (Durmuş et al. 2014) considers diagnosability 
analysis as an intermediate step between modeling the system 
and testing the developed software which enables signaling 
system designers to preliminary check their models. On the 
other hand, for large and complex systems, diagnosis of faults 
becomes a critical and stringent task. As pointed in (Giua and 
Seatzu 2014), due to the state explosion problem in DESs, the 
use of theoretical results while dealing with the real-world 
applications becomes complicated and sometimes 
inapplicable. 
Therefore, instead of constructing a diagnoser for the whole 
system and checking its diagnosability, similar to (Debouk 
2003) and (Contant et al. 2006), we will study the system 
model with respect to its subsystems and check the 
diagnosability of each subsystem (diagnosability of the 
modules) to show the overall diagnosability. The reader is 
referred to (Zaytoon and Lafortune 2013; Takai 2008; Zhou 
et al. 2008), for the overview of DES based fault diagnosis 
methods and for detailed explanation on modular fault 
diagnosis. 
2. PRELIMINARIES 
2.1  Fixed-Block Signaling System Components 
The traffic control center is responsible for all railway traffic 
by providing an interface between the interlocking system 
and the dispatchers. Dispatchers (responsible officer) may 
send several requests to the interlocking system for 
evaluation such as route reservation request, point machine 
position request or field component blocking requests. 
Another main responsibility of the traffic control center is to 
log and monitor the train movements. 
The interlocking system receives the requests of the traffic 
control center, and evaluates these requests for a final 
decision. The requests of the dispatchers can be accepted or 
rejected according to the safety restrictions. The design, 
development and the testing process of the interlocking 
system should be carefully handled and realized with respect 
to the related functional safety requirements (Durmuş et al. 
2013, Durmuş et al. 2015a). 
Railway blocks (RBs) are the subsections of the railway lines 
with fixed-length. The entrance and exit of a RB is equipped 
with signals to inform train drivers. The location of the trains 
are detecting by using simple electrical circuits know as track 
circuits or devices known as axle counters. 
Signals (SLs) are used to inform the train drivers about the 
situation of their way. Even different colours and their 
combinations are in use and differ from country to country, 
the red colour and the green colour have similar meanings. 
Turkish State Railways use the red colour to denote the next 
two RBs are occupied whereas the green colour denotes the 
next two RBs are free. The yellow colour denotes the next RB 
is unoccupied but not the RB after the next. Depending on the 
topology of the railway field, an additional yellow colour is 
also used by Turkish State Railway to denote the line change. 
Generally, this additional yellow colour is placed at the 
bottom of the signal before entering point machine regions. 
Point machines (PMs) are devices which enable trains to pass 
from one railway line to another. A PM can be operated 
either by a route reservation request or manually via traffic 
control center. The position of a PM can be also adjusted 
from the railway feld by the responsible officers (shunter) by 
using a lever. 
General representation of a fixed-block signaling system is 
illustrated in Fig. 1. More detailed definitions of the 
components of fixed-block railway signaling systems can be 
found in (Hall 2001). 
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Fig. 1. General representation of a fixed-block signaling 
system. 
2.2  Petri nets 
A Petri net is defined by Murata (1989) as 
 0, , , , ,PN P T F W M  (1) 
where 
  1 2, ,..., kP p p p  is the finite set of places, 
  1 2, ,..., zT t t t  is the finite set of transitions, 
    F P T T P     is the set of arcs, 
  : 1,2,3,...W F  is the weight function, 
  0 : 0,1,2,3,...M P   is the initial marking, 
 P T   and P T  . 
We use  jI t  and  jO t  to represent the sets of input places 
and output places of transition tj, respectively, as 
    : , ,j i i jI t p P p t F    (2) 
    : , .j i j iO t p P t p F    (3) 
For a marking  : 0,1,2,3,...M P  ,  iM p n  means that 
the ith place has n tokens (Murata 1989). A marking M can 
also be represented by a vector with k elements where k is the 
total number of places. 
Definition 2.2.1 (Cassandras and Lafortune 2008): A 
transition tj is said to be enabled at a marking M if each input 
place pi of tj has at least  ,i jW p t  tokens, where  ,i jW p t  
is the weight of the arc from place pi to transition tj, that is, 
   ,i i jM p W p t  for all  i jp I t . 
  
     
 
Note that if  jI t  , transition tj is always enabled. An 
enabled transition may or may not fire (depending on whether 
or not the event actually takes place). The firing of an 
enabled transition tj removes  ,i jW p t  tokens from each 
 i jp I t  and adds  ,j iW t p  tokens to each  i jp O t , 
where  ,j iW t p  is the weight of the arc from tj to pi. That is, 
       , , ,i i i j j iM p M p W p t W t p     (4) 
where  iM p  is the number of tokens in the ith place after 
the firing of transition tj, and we let  , 0i jW p t   if 
 ,i jp t F  and  , 0j iW t p   if  ,j it p F . The notation 
jM t   denotes that a transition tj is enabled at a marking 
M. Also, jM t M    denotes that after the firing of tj at M, 
the resulting marking is M  . These notations can be 
extended to a sequence of transitions. 
Definition 2.2.2 (Murata 1989): A Petri net PN is said to be 
pure if it has no self-loops and said to be ordinary if all of its 
arc weights are 1. 
Definition 2.2.3 (Murata 1989): A marking Mn is reachable 
from the initial marking M0 in a Petri net PN if there exists a 
sequence of transitions 1 2 nt t t  such that 
  0 1 1 2 1n n nM t M t M t M    and  0R M  denotes the 
set of all reachable markings from M0. 
Definition 2.2.4 (Murata 1989): A Petri net PN is said to be 
m-bounded if the number of tokens in each place does not 
exceed a finite number m, that is, 
   0 ,  :k i k iM R M p P M p m     . Additionally, a Petri 
net PN is safe if it is 1-bounded. 
Definition 2.2.5 (Murata 1989; Li et al. 2008): A Petri net 
PN is said to be deadlock-free (complete absence of 
deadlocks) if at least one transition is enabled at every 
reachable marking  0kM R M . 
The set P of places is partitioned into the set Po of observable 
places and the set Puo of unobservable places (Ushio et al. 
1998). Similarly, the set T of transitions is partitioned into the 
set To of observable transitions and the set Tuo of 
unobservable transitions. That is, 
o uoP P P   and ,o uoP P   (5) 
o uoT T T   and .o uoT T   (6) 
Also, a subset TF of Tuo represents the set of faulty transitions. 
It is assumed that there are n different failure types and 
 1 2,  ,  ,  F nF F F  is the set of failure types. That is, 
1 2
,
nF F F F
T T T T   
 (7) 
where 
i jF F
T T   if i j . The label set is defined as 
  2 FN   where N denotes the label “normal” which 
indicates that no faulty transition has fired, and 2 F
 
denotes 
the power set of F , that is, 2 F  is the set of all subsets of 
F . In the rest of the paper, unobservable places and 
unobservable transitions are represented by striped places and 
striped transitions as shown in Fig. 2. 
Unobservable place and 
transition
Observable place and 
transition
 
Fig. 2. Representations of places and transitions. 
2.3  Fault Diagnosis and The Modular Architecture 
As mentioned by (Sampath et al. 1995) and (Ushio et al. 
1998), a Petri net system PN is diagnosable, if it is possible to 
detect the type of the fault within a finite number of firings of 
transitions after the occurrence of the fault. Due to the 
existence of unobservable places, some markings cannot be 
distinguished and therefore, the quotient set  0Rˆ M  is 
defined with respect to the equivalence relation ( ) ; 
     00 0ˆ ˆ ˆ: : ,  ...,  ,  ...nR MR M M M   where 0 0ˆM M  
(Wen et al. 2004). An element of  0Rˆ M  is referred to the 
observation of a marking or an observable marking. 
1 2M M  denotes that the observations of markings M1 and 
M2 are the same for any i op P , if    1 2i iM p M p . The 
diagnoser of the whole system is an automaton given by 
 0,  ,  ,  ,d d o dG Q q   (8) 
where dQ Q  is the set of states which are reachable from 
the initial state 0q  under the state transition function d , 
 0ˆo oR M T    is the set of events, :d d o dQ Q    is 
the partial state transition function, and   0 0 ,q M N  is the 
initial state. The diagnoser state qd is of the form 
      1 1 2 2, , , , , ,d n nq M l M l M l , which consists of pairs 
of a marking  0iM R M  and a label il  . Each observed 
event o o   represents the observation of a marking in 
 0Rˆ M  or an observable transition in To. The transition 
function d  is defined by using the label propagation 
function and the range function. The detailed explanation of 
the label propagation function and the modified range 
function of (Chung 2005) can be found in (Durmuş et al. 
2014). 
As mentioned in (Debouk 2003) and (Contant et al. 2006), 
instead of dealing with the state explosion problem of the 
diagnoser and checking the diagnosability of the whole 
system, the diagnosability of the Petri net system PN can be 
examined with respect to its subsystems. Before the 
definition of the modular diagnosability approach we impose 
the following two assumptions in this paper. 
  
     
 
Assumption 2.3.1 (Sampath et al. 1995; Ushio et al. 1998): A 
Petri net system PN defined by (1) is bounded and deadlock-
free. 
Assumption 2.3.2 (Sampath et al. 1995; Ushio et al. 1998): 
There does not exist a sequence of unobservable transitions 
whose firing generates a cycle of markings which have the 
same observation, that is, for any  0iM R M  and i uot T , i 
= 1,2,...,n. 
    1 1 2 2 1 , 1,2, , : n n i jM t M t M t M i j n M M       
As described by (IEC 61508-7), the aim of the modular 
approach is the decomposition of a software system into 
small comprehensible parts in order to limit the complexity of 
the system. By considering the recommendations of the (IEC 
61508-3) where the use of modular approach and the use of 
PN formalism are highly recommended (see Table A.4 of 
IEC 61508-3), and the theory of the DES based fault 
diagnosis approach, the structure of the interlocking system 
can be separated into subsystems (or modules) as given in 
Fig. 3. Each module consists of the PN model and the 
diagnoser of each railway field component. These modules 
are linked with the other related component modules 
according to the interlocking table to form the whole system. 
As an advantage of the use of the modular approach, even if 
there can be more than one component with the same type, it 
is adequate to use a single module (a single PN model and its 
diagnoser) to represent the operational behavior of the 
component. For instance, there can be more than one point 
machine in the field but developing a single generic module 
for the point machine is sufficient. 
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Fig. 3. The modular structure of the interlocking system. 
The overall system and its diagnoser with respect to its 
subsystems can be extended as follows: 
,R PM SL RBPN PN PN PN PN     (9) 
 0,  ,  ,  ,h h h h htype type type type typed d o dG Q q   (10) 
where 
  1 2, ,...,R R R RsPN PN PN PN  are the PN models of the 
routes, 
  1 2, ,...,PM PM PM PMvPN PN PN PN  are the PN models 
of the point machines, 
  1 2, ,...,SL SL SL SLmPN PN PN PN  are the PN models of 
the signals, 
  1 2, ,...,RB RB RB RBcPN PN PN PN  are the PN models of 
the railway blocks, 
and similarly, 
h
type
dG  is the diagnoser of any module with, 
 
 
 
 
1,2,..., if, the  of the component is 
1,2,..., if, the  of the component is 
1,2,..., if, the  of the component is 
1,2,..., if, the  of the component is 
s type R
v type PM
h
m type SL
c type RB
 
(11) 
 
h
type
dQ  is the set of reachable states of the related 
modules, 
 
h
type
o  is the set of events of the related modules, 
 
h
type
d  is the set of partial state transition functions of the 
related modules, 
 0htypeq  is set of initial states of the related modules, 
The set of the diagnoser states 
n
type
hq  consists of pairs of a 
marking  0n ntype typehM R M  and a label n typeh Fl   where h is 
given by (11) and n represents the number of the diagnoser 
states (see Assumption 2.3.2). Instead of using label 
n
type
hl , we 
used label 
nh
l
 because components and so as the diagnosers 
do not share any failure type. Each observed event 
n h
type type
h o   represents the observation of a marking in 
 0ˆ ntypeR M  or an observable transition in typeoT . 
Assume that a railway field consists of two point machines 
and assume also that each PM diagnoser has five states, 
   
 
2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
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Diagnoser states of PM
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        
 (12) 
where  0n nPM PMhM R M  and n PMh Fl  . For instance, the pair 
 5 511 1,PMM l  is used to denote the marking of the first state of 
the diagnoser of PM 1 and its label whereas the initial state is 
denoted by       2 1 2 5 5 5 51 10 0 0 0 0 0 0, , , ,PM PM PM PM PMq q q M l M l  . 
According to (Contant et al. 2006) and (Durmuş et al. 2014), 
it is possible to classify states in 
h
type
dQ  as follows: 
1. A state 
n h
type type
h dq Q  is said to be -certaintypeiF  if ntypei hF l  
for any  ,
n n n
type type
h h hM l q . 
2. A state 
n h
type type
h dq Q  is said to be -uncertaintypeiF  if there 
exist  ,
n n
type
h hM l  and  ,
n n
type
h hM l   such that ntypei hF l  and 
n
type
i hF l . 
  
     
 
Theorem 2.3.1 (Sampath et al. 1995; Ushio et al. 1998; 
Contant et al. 2006): A Petri net subsystem (module) is 
diagnosable if and only if the diagnoser of any component of 
the subsystem does not contain an -indeterminatetypeiF  cycle 
for any failure type typeiF . As omitted by (Contant et al. 
2006), the proof of this theorem is also omitted here and can 
be found in (Sampath et al. 1995). 
3. MODELING the SYSTEM COMPONENTS: SIGNALS 
In this section, the Petri net models of the signals and their 
diagnosers which are used in the railway field given in Fig. 4. 
with its interlocking table given in Table 1. 
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1
3
PMT01
LS201
VS01
LS101
PM1
T002
LS202
RS201 EastboundWestboundYR GY
Y RG
R Y
2
RS202 YR G
Y RG
Virtual signal
Two-aspect signal
Three-aspect signal
PMX Point machine
Four-aspect signal
YR
RGY
RGY
Y
TP01
T001
 
Fig. 4. A sample railway field (R-Red, Y-Yellow and G-
Green). 
Table 1.  Part of the interlocking table of the railway field 
given in Fig. 4 
Definition Entrance 
Signal ID 
Entrance 
Signal Colour Lock Route Number Route 
Route 1 
(1-3) 
TP01-
T001 LS101 Y 
LS202 - 
Y, G 
1 
Reverse 
LS201, 
RS201 
Route 2 
(2-3) 
T002-
T001 LS201 
G LS202 - Y, G 1 Normal 
LS101, 
RS201 Y LS202 - R 
3.1  Signals 
The PN models and the diagnosers for the signals LS201 is 
illustrated in Fig. 5. The definitions of the transitions and the 
places of the PN model is given in Table 2. The places such 
as ppm1_1 and pRS201_R denoted by rectangles are the additional 
conditions of related transitions. For instance, the color of the 
signal LS201 can be yellow when the PM1 is in normal 
position and the signals RS201 and LS101 are red. 
Representations of the PN model shown in Fig. 5 is as 
follows: 
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The underlined numbers indicate the marking of the 
unobservable places. 
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Fig.5. PN model and diagnoser of the SL LS201. 
Table 2.  Meanings of places and transitions in the model 
given in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 
Place Meaning Transition Meaning 
pLS201_1 Signal is red tLS201_1 Turn signal to yellow 
pLS201_2 
Signal is 
yellow 
tLS201_3, tLS201_4 Turn signal to 
red 
pLS201_3 Signal is green LS201_21, (tLS201_22) Turn signal to green 
pLS201_4, pLS201_5, 
pLS201_8 
Color fault 
restriction of 
signal 
tLS201_5, tLS201_6, 
tLS201_8 
Signal color 
fault 
acknowledged 
pLS201_6, pLS201_7, 
pLS201_9 
Signal color 
fault has 
occurred 
(tLS201_f1, tLS201_f2, 
tLS201_f3 
Faulty color 
aspect in the 
signal 
 
For the PN models in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, it is assumed that 
there are three different failure types  1 2 3, ,SLF F F F  , 
where,  1 201_ 1SLF LS fT t ,  2 201_ 2SLF LS fT t  and 
 3 201_ 3SLF LS fT t . Even though failures F1, F2, F3 and F4 are 
identical which mean that related signal has wrong color 
indication (e.g. signal aspect is green and red at the same 
time), separate failure labels are used to specify the exact 
failures between colors. 
The diagnoser given in Fig. 5 consists of three states. 
Initially, the color of the signal LS201 is red and illustrated 
by the initial state {(1,0,0,1,1,0,0,1,0, )}N . The color of 
the signal LS201 can be yellow by an incoming route 
reservation command from the traffic control center (eg. 
route request from 2 to 3). At this situation, the state of the 
diagnoser will be {(0,1,0,1,1,0,0,1,0, )}N  by observing 
the marking 
6
201
1
ˆ LSM  and the observable transition 2101_1LSt . If 
  
     
 
the signal LS201 will be red and yellow at the same time, or 
in other words, if the marking 
6
201
4
ˆ LSM  is observed, the state 
of the diagnoser becomes 1{(0,0,0,0,1,1,0,1,0, )}F  In this 
state, the interlocking system will inform the traffic control 
center and provides the safety of the railway field. 
According to Theorem 2.3.1 given in Subchapter 2.3 and the 
diagnoser given in Fig. 5, there is no -indeterminatetypeiF  
cycle for any failure type in typeF  and the components of the 
modules are diagnosable in the considered situation. Note 
that, it is also possible to verify that the modules and the 
overall system are entirely diagnosable and this method is 
also applicable to systems which can be modeled as modules 
as presented in this paper. Even if a single model is used to 
represent the behavior of each component, the name of the 
transitions and places should be labeled carefully while 
converting all models to software blocks. After the software 
blocks has obtained, each block should linked with the other 
software blocks according to the interlocking table. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Developing a signaling system for large-scale fixed-block 
railway fields becomes a hard task by using the 
recommended methods in the railway related functional 
safety standards due to the exponential growth of the state 
space. On the other hand, inspecting the fixed-block signaling 
systems with respect to its subsystems (railway field 
components) makes the designing step which includes the 
modeling and the fault diagnosis much easier. The 
application of modular fault diagnosis approach of DES 
enables designers to cope with the large-scale fixed-block 
railway fields in an easy way due to their modular structure. 
This approach allows designers to check the adequacy of 
their models before passing to the testing phase and the 
developed system should be tested by using several methods 
for different scenarios to provide the required safety integrity 
level. 
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